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NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES
UNION v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
AUTHORITY: WHO IS DETERMINING
OUR NATIONAL LABOR POLICY?
Administrative agencies were created by Congress in an at-
tempt to facilitate the management of a variety of statutes.' To
meet this challenge successfully, each agency is vested with a de-
gree of discretion and autonomy2 based on its expertise in a spe-
cific field.3 The function of each agency is to further the ends of its
' See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & E. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 11 (2d ed.
1980). As early as 1789, the first session of Congress recognized the need for an administra-
tive structure and passed the first three statutes conferring such powers. B. SCHWARTz, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW § 7, at 16 (1976). Congress may decide to create a new agency for a vari-
ety of reasons. These include: 1) a desire "not to legislate in detail because of the heavy
burdens such an approach would impose on Congress;" 2) "the need for frequent statutory
amendments as conditions change"; and 3) "the frequent presence of technical matters on
which Congress is not knowledgeable." G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & E. BRUFF, supra, at 11.
Congress is faced with the need to address a wide array of problems. One commentator
suggests that the congressional decision to create an agency is in direct response to this
need:
When searching for government solutions to specific problems it is often
found that a specialized information gatherer and expert decisionmaker is neces-
sary. Often this condition leads to the decision to constitute an agency .... Sensi-
tivity to the special problems of a group is necessary for those who intend to regu-
late or serve them.
1 C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.26, at 47 (1985). Another commentator
has observed that "early agencies were created because practical men were seeking practical
answers to immediate problems." K. DAVIS, HANDBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3, at 10
(1951).
2 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 571 (1982) (arrangements through
which agencies and outside organizations can cooperate to protect fully the public interest).
This delegation has been held proper in a variety of cases since the late 1930's. Al-
though two pieces of New Deal legislation were struck down in 1935, see Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 551 (1935), the Court has since upheld a variety of legislation with delegation
clauses so broad as to require only that acts be in the public interest. National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-27 (1943); see United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 180-81 (1968); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 208 (1947); Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940). Despite this apparent approval of
administrative autonomy, the courts have also pointed out the need for Congress to "set[]
forth some meaningful standards to guide administrators." K. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 93 (1982).
' C. KOCH, supra note 1, at 47. Agencies are recognized for expertise in their assigned
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enabling statute by resolving disputes that arise thereunder and to
enforce regulations promulgated to further those ends.4 One such
agency, the Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA" or "Au-
thority"),5 oversees issues that arise in the area of public employ-
ment.' This agency, by enforcing the Federal Service Labor-Man-
fields. It is through this expertise that they can accurately administer highly technical stat-
utes. An agency can, to some extent, base a change in policy on the experience and expertise
it has acquired during the course of its existence. Ryder Truck Lines v. United States, 716
F.2d 1369, 1385 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984).
To assure independence, many statutes require that agency leaders serve staggered
terms and come from different political parties. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982); G. ROBINSON, E.
GELLHORN, & H. BRUFF, supra note 1, at 7-8. Furthermore, most agency leaders are pro-
tected from arbitrary discharge without cause. Id.
Congress created agencies to be responsible for specific areas of the law. This allows the
level of expertise to increase continually. See id. at 11-12.
' See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 5. (agencies have authority to decide "what shall or
shall not be done in a given situation" and many have the authority to regulate the exercise
of certain rights as well).
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2)(a) (1982), "defines an agency as
each governmental authority other than the legislature or the courts." B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 1, at 7. Realistically, many of the responsibilities of administrative agencies overlap
with those of the courts and Congress. See id. at 8.
5 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982).
6 5 U.S.C. § 7105 (1982). The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 includes the Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute ("FSLMRS" or "Statute"). 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 -
7135 (1982). This was enacted to remedy perceived weaknesses in its predecessor, Executive
Order 11,491. 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1966-70); see Defense Logistics Agency v. FLRA, 754 F.2d
1003, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1985). FSLMRS codified amendments to Executive Order 11,491
which were recommended by the Federal Labor Relations Council. Id. at 1008; see also
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND PROCEDURES 5-61 (E. Bussey ed. 1984) (federal labor man-
agement relations had developed under executive orders and needed codification and reor-
ganization). Each of the executive orders made improvements, but a number of areas re-
mained to be addressed. This led to the passage of the FSLMRS. See Coleman, The Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978: Its Meaning and Its Roots, 31 LAB. L.J. 200, 201 (1980); Note,
Status Quo Ante Remedies Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Stat-
ute, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 353, 358-59 & n.39 (1983)("Statute, unlike the Order, explicitly en-
courages collective bargaining.").
The FSLMRS was drafted to parallel most sections of the National Labor Relations
Acts. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982). H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1978); see
Note, supra, at 353 ("The Authority performs essentially the same functions that are per-
formed by the National Labor Relations Board in the private sector.").
The Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA") is a neutral, bipartisan body with the
full-time commitment of its members. 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1982); see Coleman, supra, at 202-
03. Section 7104 established the FLRA and describes it as an independent executive agency
primarily responsible for the administration and enforcement of the policies reflected in thq
FSLMRS. H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra, at 41; see Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
500-01 (1978)(agency is expert charged with implementing and developing policies); Es-
treicher, The Second Circuit and the NLRA 1980-1981: A Case Study in Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1063, 1071 (1982)("The expectation was that the
Board would apply its familiarity with labor relations and collective bargaining and its sen-
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agement Relations Statute ("FSLMRS" or "Statute"), is the initial
arbiter of disagreements between public employees-through their
unions-and their respective employers.7 To facilitate the func-
tioning of the FLRA, Congress defined the scope of judicial review
in accordance with section 706 of title V of the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act ("APA"),5 which restricts a court from overturning an
agency decision unless it was found to be "arbitrary, capricious,
[or] an abuse of discretion." 9 To further the intent of Congress in
drafting the APA, the United States Supreme Court in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council0 created a two
sitivity to the regulatory problems in the field to resolving some of the open questions in the
statute").
The FSLMRS has not provided so expansive a list of bargainable topics as are available
to employees in the private sector. Whereas, federal employees may bargain over conditions
of employment, 5 U.S.C. § 7106(2) (1982), employees in the private sector are covered by
mandatory bargaining over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Rights of employees in the private sector extend into a wide range of
negotiable topics. Public employees may bargain over these types of topics only when they
are raised by the Agency. 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (1983). It is not up to the authorized representa-
tive of the employees to raise them. See Coleman, supra, at 205.
The most important difference between public and private sector collective action is
that employees in the private sector can exert economic pressure on their employers through
a strike. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982). This alternative is statutorily prohibited for public employ-
ees. 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (b)(7)(A) (1982); see Coleman, supra, at 204-05.
7 5 U.S.C. § 7105 (1982).
8 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982); see 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c) (19.82) ("Review of the Authority's order
shall be on the record in accordance with section 706 of this title."); H.R. REP. No. 1403,
supra note 6, at 57 ("Review of Authority orders is on the record and the scope of review by
the court is governed by section 706 of title 5").
' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional rights, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole rec-
ord or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule
of prejudicial error,
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982); see infra note 51 for a review of cases interpreting section 706(2)(A).
10 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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step test to be used by courts in reviewing agency determina-
tions."' Recently, however, in National Treasury Employees
Union v. FLRA,12 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit cir-
cumvented the dictates of Chevron and thereby stripped the
FLRA of its discretionary authority by mandating a Retroactive
Bargaining Order ("RBO") is in a situation where the FLRA had
" See id. at 842-43. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, set out the test:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.
Application of Chevron has led to considerable controversy. Professor Richard J. Pierce
Jr. argues for an expansive reading of Chevron, seeing Chevron as a vehicle leading to posi-
tive results in the policy making process in the administrative state. See Pierce, Chevron
and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41
VAND. L. REv. 301, 303-04 (1988). Professor Pierce draws a distinction between determining
law and determining policy and argues that administrative policy determinations should not
be subject to particularized review. Id. at 304-07. He argues further that too many judges
embark on complex and overreaching attempts at statutory construction simply to justify
their determination of a policy issue and that by engaging in such "creative statutory inter-
pretation" they are usurping the policy making authority vested in the agency. Id.
Agencies have been set up to determine policy based on their expertise. A proper bal-
ance must be achieved to prevent both the courts and the agencies from overstepping their
bounds. Accordingly, the courts must not "rubber-stamp ... administrative decisions that
they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy
underlying a statute." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97
(1983).
However, "an agency acting within its authority to make policy choices consistent with
the congressional mandate should receive considerable deference from courts, provided, of
course, that its actions conform to applicable procedural requirements and are not 'arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with the law.' " Id.
at 98 n.8.
12 856 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
" See id. at 296. The court determined that to effect the goals of the statute, it was
required to award the fullest measure of relief available. Id. at 301. The court remanded
with instructions for "redetermination not inconsistent with this opinion." Id. (emphasis
added).
In his dissent, Judge Silberman was troubled by the majority's interpretation. Id. at 305
(Silberman, J., dissenting). He did not find it clear that "Congress allowed (much less re-
quired) the Authority to order retroactivity of an agreement ... yet to be agreed upon by
the parties." Id. (Silberman, J., dissenting). The majority made a number of statements
indicating it had adopted an arguably erroneous interpretation: "according to the majority,
the statute requires an RBO to be used routinely." Id. (Silberman, J., dissenting); FLRA
was not asked to consider the appropriateness of an RBO, but was told to apply it. Id. at
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determined that such an order was not required. 14
In National Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
notified the National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU" or
"Union") of a plan to relocate two IRS offices to a suburban of-
fice."5 Although the IRS bargained with the Union over a number
of aspects of the move,'" it refused to bargain over parking ar-
rangements at the new location because, in the IRS's opinion, "no
material change in working conditions had occurred with the relo-
cation.' 7 The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
FLRA claiming the IRS had breached its duty to bargain in good
faith under section 7116(a)(5) of the FSLMRS8 and requested an
order mandating that the IRS bargain over the parking issue.' 9
The Authority determined that the IRS had in fact unlawfully re-
fused to bargain and ordered it to do so, but the Authority denied
the Union's request that the order be retroactive.2" The Authority
justified its determination as "preserv[ing] the parties' flexibility
306 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 296.
15 Id. at 295.
16 Id. at 296.
17 Id. at 295. The IRS reached the conclusion that it had no obligation to bargain based
on the Travel Expense Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5752 (1982), and the Federal Travel Regula-
tions, 41 C.F.R. Part 101-7 (1987). National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 302 (Silberman, J., dis-
senting). These statutes, "as interpreted by the Comptroller General, [mandate that] federal
employees must bear as personal commuting expenses all costs of transportation including
parking fees." Id. (Silberman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In an earlier FLRA deci-
sion, the Authority found that a proposal by the American Federation of Government Em-
ployees ("AFGE") which requested a guarantee that no employee would "suffer[] financial
loss due to increased commuting, transportation cost i.e., higher parking fees" was inconsis-
tent with federal law and, therefore, non-negotiable. Id. (Silberman, J., dissenting) (quoting
AFGE v. General Servs. Admin., 9 F.L.R.A. 825, 827 (1982)). The House Report prior to
passage of the Statute indicates that "disputes concerning the negotiability of proposals...
be resolved through the filing and processing of unfair labor practice charges under section
7116 and section 7118." H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 6, at 50.
" National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 295. Section 7116 provides:
(a) For the purpose of this chapter, it shall be an unfair labor practice for an agency-
(5) to refuse to consult or negotiate in good faith with a labor organization as required
by this chapter; ....
5 U.S.C. § 7116 (a)(5)(1982).
19 See National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 295.
20 See id. The FLRA relied upon the decision in EPA v. American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees, 21 F.L.R.A. 786, 788 (1986), which stated:
[a] prospective bargaining order is neither inadequate nor inherently restrictive of the par-
ties rights to address the effects on unit employees .... The parties might be less reluctant
and more expeditious in reaching an overall agreement if they retain the flexibility to deter-
mine which provisions will be given retroactive effect. Id.
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by allowing them to adopt a variety of terms while leaving them
free to agree to retroactive application."'" On appeal, however, the
D.C. Circuit found the failure of the Authority to order such retro-
active relief to be an abuse of the Authority's discretion.22
Judge Mikva, writing for the court, held that an RBO should
have been issued by the Authority.2 The court determined that
where an employer unlawfully refuses to bargain, it becomes neces-
sary, in order "to effect the deterrent and remedial goals of the
Statute," for the Authority to "award the fullest measure of 'make
whole' relief. ' 24  Interpreting section 7105(g)(3)25 and section
7118(a)(7)(D)26 of the FSLMRS, the court concluded that, upon
21 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 295.
22 See id. at 295-96.
2" See id. at 296, 301. The retroactive bargaining order ("RBO"), as ordered by the
majority, allows the parties to negotiate the substance of the agreement, but mandates that
the terms be applied retroactively to remedy any losses incurred by employees as a result of
the employers' initial refusal to bargain. Id. at 296-97. This remedy is used when specific,
individualized injury cannot be determined. Id. When an employer has acted unilaterally,
the preferred approach is status quo ante ("SQA") relief. Id. An SQA order returns each
individual to the position they would have been in had no unilateral action been taken. Id.;
see Defense Logistics Agency v. FLRA, 754 F.2d 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See generally,
Note, supra note 6, at 358-61 (discussing SQA remedies under the FSLMRA).
14 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 296; see Note, supra note 6, at 355-56, 377-78 (con-
cluding that Authority had failed to exercise its power to award make-whole relief to extent
intended by Congress).
25 5 U.S.C. § 7105(g)(3) (1982). The relevant text provides:
(g) In order to carry out its functions under this chapter, the Authority -
(3) may require an agency or labor organization to cease and desist from violations of
this chapter and require it to take any remedial action it considers appropriate to carry out
the policies of this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
26 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(7)(D) (1982) provides in part:
If the Authority (or any member thereof or any individual employed by the Au-
thority and designated for such purpose) determines after any hearing on a com-
plaint under paragraph (5) of this subsection that the preponderance of the evi-
dence received demonstrates that the agency or labor organization named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, then the indi-
vidual or individuals conducting the hearing shall state in writing their findings of
fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the agency or labor organization an
order-
(A) to cease and desist from any such unfair labor practice in which the agency or
labor organization is engaged;
(B) requiring the parties to renegotiate a collective bargaining agreement in accor-
dance with the order of the Authority and requiring that the agreement, as
amended, be given retroactive effect;
(D) including any combination of the actions described in subparagraphs (A)
through (C) of this paragraph or such other action as will carry out the purpose of
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finding an unlawful refusal to bargain, an agency must impose an
RBO, provided "such an order would not unduly disrupt federal
agency administration. 21 Judge Mikva distinguished Chevron on
the ground that the "authority's construction of the Statute failed
to implement the clear intent of Congress. '2 The court's interpre-
tation of section 7118(a)(7)(D), which allows for retroactive relief,
was based in large measure on a speech by Representative Ford29
the day after the Statute was passed. Ford's speech was "intended
to supplement the 'less than helpful' conference documents that
accompanied a bill passed during the end-of-session rush."" ° Fur-
thermore, the majority determined that the language of section
7118(a)(7)(D) could be properly read to allow such retroactive re-
lief irrespective of whether the Authority had mandated the terms
to which the parties must agree.31
Judge Silberman, in a powerful dissent, attacked the majority
for "misappropriat[ing] a policy choice that Congress delegated to
the FLRA.''3 2 Recognizing the high degree of deference typically
afforded agency determinations,"3 Judge Silberman found the ac-
this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
2? National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 296. The FSLMRS offers the Authority its choice of
several enumerated remedies, or the Authority may fashion the remedy it deems appropri-
ate to further the aims of the Statute. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7118 (1982).
28 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 296.
29 124 CONG. REC. 38,713 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978)(statement of Rep. Ford).
"o National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 299-300 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38, 713 (daily ed.
Oct. 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Ford)).
"' National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 300; see 5 U.S.C. § 7118 (a)(7)(D) (1982). The lan-
guage of § 7118 (a)(7)(B) is applicable when the Authority order includes renegotiation by
the parties to reach a specified result. Id. at § 7118 (a)(7)(B). When this predetermined
result is reached, retroactivity may be required. Id. For further discussion of SQA remedies,
see supra note 23 and accompanying text. The language of § 7105(a)(2) appears to leave the
determination of the appropriate remedy to the discretion of the Authority. See 5 U.S.C. §
7105 (a)(2).
12 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 301 (Silberman, J., dissenting). Judge Silberman
analogized the action of the majority to a "taking," noting that "if private property rather
than regulatory authority were at stake, just compensation would be owed." Id. (Silberman,
J., dissenting).
22 See id. (Silberman, J., dissenting); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 840
F.2d 925, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court's review of FLRA determinations "is highly defer-
ential, and [the court] will uphold a remedial order of the FLRA 'unless it can be shown
that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said
to effectuate the policies of the Act.'" Id. (quoting Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.
v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). See generally Starr, Judicial Review in the
Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 292-93, 312 (1986)(obligation of federal courts to
defer to agency's reasonable construction of statutes administered by that agency).
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tion by the majority to have "effectuated a major and far reaching
amendment to the FLRA. ''3 4 Further, the dissent contended that
the words of section 7118(a)(7)(B) grant the FLRA power to man-
date substantive terms35 and apply these terms retroactively, but
do not indicate that the FLRA may mandate retroactivity on
terms yet to be negotiated by the parties.3 6 Judge Silberman also
pointed out that the post-enactment legislative history relied on by
the majority departed from the standards of interpretation clearly
set out in Chevron.7 Finally, the dissent argued that, by ordering
the result the FLRA was required to reach,38 rather than allowing
the Authority to reconsider its order based on the concerns of the
majority,39 the court was remanding in name only.
" National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 302 (Silberman, J., dissenting). Judge Silberman ar-
gued that the refusal to bargain was not a unilateral removal of a benefit previously availa-
ble, and therefore there was no status quo to which the parties could return. Id. at 303
(Silberman, J., dissenting).
15 U.S.C. § 7118 (a)(7)(B) (1982). This is a major difference between the public and
private sectors. As a result of the limitations on bargainable terms, as well as the strict
prohibition against strikes in the public sector, see supra note 6, § 7118(a)(7)(B) allows the
agency to fashion substantive terms. In contrast, regardless of the degree of bad faith, or
egregious conduct, the NLRB may not compel either side to agree to substantive terms. See
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970)("it is the job of Congress. . .to decide
when.., to allow. . . compulsory submission to one side's demands").
11 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 305 (Silberman, J., dissenting); see 5 U.S.C. §
7118(a)(7)(B) (1982). It is submitted that to mandate retroactivity in cases where the out-
come is uncertain will force parties to bear potentially staggering costs and will chill the
bargaining effort. Further, it seems naive to suggest that awareness of the retroactive appli-
cation of terms will not affect the bargaining process. Congressional intent that neither
party be forced to agree to a proposal, or to make a concession is clear. See H.R. REP. No.
1403, supra note 6, at 40.
'7 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 305-08 (Silberman, J., dissenting); see Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). If "Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute ... [but] the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. On review, the court need
not find the agency construction to be the only interpretation, nor need it be the one the
court would have reached de novo. The court must decide only whether the result reached
by the agency "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843 & n.11; see
also Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation:
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985 DuKE L.J. 469, 477-96 (1985)
(Chevron set out coherent framework for structuring review of agency determinations).
'8 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 305, 308 (Silberman, J., dissenting). Judge Silberman
noted that the D.C. Circuit Court had previously been reversed for enlarging an agency
order rather than remanding to the agency for reconsideration. Id.; see NLRB v. Food Store
Employees Union Local 347, 417 U.S. 1, 10 (1974).
3' National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 305, 308 (Silberman, J., dissenting). Judge Silberman
maintained that the order of the majority was phrased in such a way that the FLRA was
told what it had to do and stripped of its discretion to reconsider the issues. See id. at 306
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It is submitted that by mandating retroactive relief in all situ-
ations involving a good faith refusal to bargain, the D.C. Circuit
has impermissibly usurped the legitimate policy-making authority
of the FLRA. The necessary balance between the judiciary and the
administrative agency is crucial to the successful operation of the
FLRA as well as other federal agencies. This Comment will suggest
that the court's failure to defer to the legitimate finding of the
FLRA that retroactive relief was unnecessary distorts both the in-
tent of Congress in enacting the FSLMRS and the appropriate
standard of judicial review set out in the APA. Furthermore, this
Comment will assert that the appropriate role for the court is the
role defined by Chevron, which, assures deference where
appropriate.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AS POLICY-MAKERS
Once created, an agency is vested with the authority to shape
policy within the sphere of its expertise.40 This delegation of au-
thority by Congress has repeatedly been held proper.4 ' When
agency authority is judicially questioned, the court's role is to de-
termine if "agency action is: (a) pursuant to a statute that is con-
stitutional (b) authorized by statute (c) based on fair procedures
[and] (d) substantively rational." '42
The FLRA, designed to emulate the National Labor Relations
Board,43 is deemed the expert on questions of national labor policy
relating to public employees. 44 Public employees have limited pro-
tection in comparison to their counterparts in the private sector.45
It is suggested that policy determinations must be made by a sin-
gle entity in order to insure the fullest degree of bargaining
strength under the FSLMRS and to assure nationwide uniformity.
(Silberman, J., dissenting).
40 See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (agency
is expected to gain expertise in its field during its existence); Ryder Truck Lines v. United
States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1385 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); see also C. KOCH, supra note 1, at 41,
47; K. WARREN, supra note 2, at 36, 80.
41 See supra note 2.
42 G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, supra note 1, at 27.
43 H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 6, at 41; see Coleman, supra note 6, at 202; Frazier,
Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Government, 30 LAB. L.J. 131, 133 (1979).
41 See Frazier, supra note 43, at 133-34. Frazier writes that upon the FLRA's creation,
even the President could no longer say what the FSLMRS meant since this became the role
of the FLRA. Id. at 134.
45 See supra note 6.
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The appointment of dedicated and experienced practitioners and
the evolution of numerous decisions indicate that the FLRA's de-
termination of policy questions must be accorded appropriate def-
erence. 46 In addition, section 7118 affords the Authority a variety
of alternative remedies, all phrased as discretionary.4 7 To effectu-
ate this delegation of policy-making authority, the APA has vested
reviewing courts with limited discretion when faced with an agency
decision on appeal.4"
In National Treasury, the Authority determined that the IRS
should be required to bargain over the disputed issue, and so or-
dered.49  The FLRA further determined that nothing in the
FSLMRS required an RBO in a situation involving a good faith
disagreement over bargainability. 50 It is submitted that the Au-
thority's finding of an unfair labor practice and its choice of a pro-
spective bargaining order were within the scope of its expertise and
discretion.
ROLE OF THE COURTS IN REVIEWING AGENCY DECISIONS
Section 706 of the APA was promulgated to guide reviewing
courts.5' Thus, where an agency makes a determination under its
enabling statute, the court is to defer to that decision unless it is
" See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984); K. WARREN, supra note 2, at 42-43 (noting that courts have neither time nor exper-
tise to review more than small fraction of administrative decisions).
'4 See 5 U.S.C. § 7118 (1982).
41 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Cam-
paign Comm'n, 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981) (question for court is whether agency construction is
"sufficiently reasonable," not whether it is sole possibility); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (judicial role is narrow: rule adopted by Board is judicially reviewable
for consistency with the Act, and for rationality; if supported by substantial evidence on the
record taken whole, it must be enforced); Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 331 (1976) (per curiam)(determination must be based on
administrative record, and be vacated and remanded only if unsupportable on that record.).
Justice Scalia has argued that the majority's statements in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring), are flatly inconsistent with well established standards
because the implication is: "courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that
of an agency whenever, '[elmploying traditional tools of statutory construction', they are
able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute." Id. at 454 (Scalia,
J., concurring); see also Note, Judicial Review of Labor Board Decisions and the Midwest
Piping Doctrine, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 499, 502 (1985) (judicial review is not designed to re-
place the Board; rather, the court owes agency special deference.).
40 National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 295.
50 Id.
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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"arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 52 The FSLMRS
was enacted with the express expectation that this limited scope of
review would apply to decisions made by the FLRA5 3
Courts and agencies have been likened to partnerships. 54 The
court's function is not to supervise but to operate within the sys-
tem of checks and balances, 5 insuring consideration of all relevant
factors.58 It is suggested that although the congressional intent un-
derlying the creation of a specialized agency to administer public
employee labor relations was to allow policy determinations to rest
within that agency, the National Treasury court substituted its
judgment for that of the FLRA.57
The legislative history of the FSLMRS indicates congressional
choice that questions of bargainability be handled as unfair labor
practices upon one party's refusal to bargain .5  However, the Na-
82 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The courts have defined the terms "arbitrary," "capri-
cious," and "abuse of discretion" in a multitude of cases. Although each varies slightly, the
pattern is one of deferral to agency decision making. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(to survive challenge in court, agency must articu-
late valid explanation connecting facts to results); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)("arbitrary and capricious standard" of APA is "highly def-
erential" and presumes validity of agency action); Guste v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 327 (5th
Cir. 1988)(where agency "considers the factors and articulates a rational relationship be-
tween the facts found and the choice made, its decision is not arbitrary or capri-
cious")(citing Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 641 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1981));
United Food & Comm'l Workers v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(board given
great discretion and will be affirmed unless order is a direct attempt to achieve ends other
than those to "effectuate policies of the act"); Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d
275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(standard is highly deferential and court must affirm if "a rational
basis for the agency's decision is presented"); Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United
States, 635 F.2d 1301, 1307 (7th Cir. 1980)(must affirm if "rational basis exists for the
agency decision").
13 H.R. REP. No. 1403, surpa note 6, at 57.
I See Estreicher, supra note 6, at 1063, 1064 & n.7 (1982). Quoting Judge Leventhal of
the D.C. Circuit, the author analogized the relationship between administrative agencies and
reviewing courts as a partnership: "[T]he process ... combines judicial supervision with a
salutary principal of judicial restraint, an awareness that agencies and courts together con-
stitute a 'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest and are 'collaborative instrumen-
talities of justice.'" Id. (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-
52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)); see Gardner, Federal Courts and
Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 800, 800 (1975).
'5 See Gardner, supra note 54, at 800.
s6 See Koch, Confining Judicial Authority Over Administrative Action, 49 Mo. L. REv.
183, 214-15 (1984). Koch advocates meticulous action by the courts to avoid judicial involve-
ment in the policy-making delegated to agencies. Id. at 216. Some judges object to this
restriction as they desire the final say in important policy decisions. Horowitz, The Courts
as Guardians of the Public Interest, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 150, 150 (1977).
57 856 F.2d at 300.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1403, supra note 6, at 50. The IRS refused to bargain as a result
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tional Treasury court, after searching the legislative history, chose
to rely on post-enactment statements by the sponsor of the
FSLMRS regarding the strength he envisioned the statute to
have.59 Judge Mikva, relying on these statements, determined that
retroactivity should be ordered routinely.60 It is submitted that
this result counters the expressed intent of Congress and estab-
lishes precedent under which courts in the future may usurp the
policy making discretion properly vested in a federal agency. It is
further suggested that this court, by mandating retroactivity in all
good faith bargaining refusals has chilled the free bargaining pro-
cess; parties will be forced to bargain over arguably excluded topics
to avoid potentially staggering retroactive liability.
Furthermore, the National Treasury decision requires an
RBO whenever the goals of management deterrence and employee
of a good faith disagreement as to whether the parking issue was negotiable. National Trea-
sury, 856 F.2d at 302 (Silberman, J., dissenting). The committee report of the House of
Representatives indicates that disputes concerning negotiability were to be handled as an
unfair labor practice. H.R. RP. No. 1403, surpa note 6, at 50. It is submitted that by utiliz-
ing the statutory machinery through which Congress sought to resolve a good faith disagree-
ment as to bargainability, the IRS was penalized by being required to adopt retroactive
terms on issues not yet decided.
11 See National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 299-300; 124 CONG. REc. 38, 714 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1978). Representative Ford stated, "the courts will oversee the work of the Authority in
this area (as well as others) in order to insure that the Authority vigorously enforces the
purposes and provisions of title VII by adopting remedies sufficiently strong and suitable to
make real the promise of the title." Id.; see Mikva, The Role of Legislative History in Judi-
cial Interpretation: A Discussion Between Judge Kenneth W. Starr and Judge Abner J.
Mikva: A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 385 (1937).
After the initial plain meaning interpretation, resort should be to Congressional Com-
mittee Reports. Id.; see Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U.
PA. L. REv. 549, 554 (1985)("Going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a
possibly contrary congressional intent is 'a step to be taken cautiously' even under the best
of circumstances.")(quoting Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. 63, 75 (1982)
(quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977))); Wald, The D.C. Circuit:
Here and Now, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 718, 726 (1987)("some judges see their job as ear-
nestly searching all relevent legislative materials to find out what Congress really
meant-inconclusive as those materials may often be"); Note, Intent, Clear Statements,
and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REv.
892, 895 (1982)("what Congress enacts is precisely what Congress intends ... [and] 'strict
adherance' to the statute's chosen words has now become the new touchstone of statutory
interpretation").
The majority justified their reliance on post enactment statements by deeming the com-
ments consistent with the statutory language, and therefore meriting some attention. Na-
tional Treasury, 856 F.2d at 300. It is submitted that these remarks were given significantly
more than "some weight." It is suggested that the National Treasury court, by relying on
statements made after passage of the statute, has circumvented Chevron in the search for
clearly expressed legislative intent.
60 See National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 297, 299, 302 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
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recompense are best served."' It is suggested that the failure of the
court to consider the good faith of the parties will have potentially
far-reaching results. Although the D.C. Circuit remanded to the
FLRA, 2 it did so with express instructions as to what result was
required. 3 This gave the FLRA no opportunity to reconsider its
initial determination, as would have been appropriate. 4
DEFERENCE AND THE CHEVRON STANDARD
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed a decision of the D.C. Circuit in the landmark Chevron
case. 5 The holding set out a two step analysis for courts to utilize
when reviewing an agency's construction of its enabling statute.6
81 See id. at 302 (Silberman, J., dissenting). As Judge Silberman pointed out, the ma-
jority has stripped the Authority of its discretionary ability to determine when this remedy
is to be imposed. Id.
" Id. at 301 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 301, 305 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
8" See NLRB v. Food Stores Employees Union, 417 U.S. 1, 10 (1974). When a reviewing
court concludes that an agency's determination constituted an abuse of discretion, remand
for reconsideration is generally the "proper course." Id. The Food Stores Court explained
the value of a remand: "the congressional scheme invest[s] the Board and not the courts
with broad powers to fashion remedies that will effectuate national labor policy." Id. The
reviewing court is not to be "propel[led] ... into the domain which Congress has set aside
exclusively for the administrative agency." Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333 (1976)(quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 322 U.S. 194, 196
(1947)); see Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984)("where a finding of 'abuse
of discretion' is made, the remedy to be granted is a remand of the issue to the relevant
agency and not a substitution of judgment by the court"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985);
Las Cruces TV Cable v. FCC, 645 F.2d 1041, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(when reviewing court
could not determine basis of agency's decision, it was compelled to remand rather than sub-
stitute its oven judgment); E.A.C. Eng'g v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 569, 570 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985)("a court remanding an action to an agency usually will allow the agency to
determine the proper procedure or method to effectuate the court's order"); see also Udall
v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967)(on remand, agency is allowed to explore those phases of
the case previously neglected).
61 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). This case focused on judicial review of the NRDC's inter-
pretation of the statute governing industrial emissions. Id. at 840. Judge Ginsburg wrote the
decision for the circuit court that was ultimately reversed by the Supreme Court. See Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The circuit court had determined that the interpretation adopted by the council was con-
trary to congressional intent and adopted a different interpretation. Id. The Supreme Court
held that the interpretation of the NRDC was permissable and that the action of the D.C.
Circuit had exceeded its reviewing authority. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. It is suggested that
Judge Mikva stepped into the role of administrative policy maker through his decision in
National Treasury.
86 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
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The test first requires a determination of whether Congress has ex-
pressly spoken on the issue in question, and, if so, that intent must
be given effect.67 If Congress has not spoken, the interpretation of
the agency must be given effect as long as it is based on a permissi-
ble interpretation of the statute.6 8 It is submitted that Chevron set
out an objective format by which to determine whether the agency
has acted within its discretionary authority.
Since the decision in Chevron, courts have routinely applied
the two step test and allowed a variety of agency decisions to
stand. 9 Yet, Judge Mikva avoided the second step of Chevron by
his initial determination that the FLRA had acted in contraven-
tion of expressed legislative intent.70 It is suggested that the Na-
tional Treasury court made this determination in order to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the Authority, thereby reaching its
preferred result.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has suggested that administrative agencies in
general, and the FLRA in particular, have been vested with the
authority to formulate policy. Appellate courts have been granted
limited authority to upset determinations of federal agencies and
may do so only if a decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or counter to the clearly expressed intent of Congress.
Yet, the D.C. Circuit has resorted to an unnecessary and inaccu-
67 Id. If congressional intent is clear, no further inquiry is needed, as the court and the
agency "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. "The
traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be applied to alter the
clearly expressed intent of Congress." Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986).
e Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
See Department of Defense v. FLRA, 863 F.2d 988, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(court need
not reach step two if congressional intent is clear); Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors
of Fed. Reserve Sys., 847 F.2d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(legislative history deemed ambigu-
ous, leading to analysis under step two of Chevron test); Emerald Mines Co. v. Federal Mine
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 863 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(where act is silent or
ambiguous, court accords deference to reasonably defensible construction); Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 1989
U.S. LEXIS 2816 (1989)("If Congress did not have a specific intent, we ask whether the
agency's construction of the statute is 'rational and consistent with the statute' "(quoting
NLRB v. United Food & Comm'l Workers Union Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413, 421, (1987));
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1988)("Congressional silence is
deemed an implicit delegation of power to an agency to make policy choices consistent with
the statutory purpose").
" National Treasury, 856 F.2d at 299-300.
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rate review of the legislative history of the FSLMRS to justify its
decision. The court improperly substituted the result it preferred
for that of the FLRA, the agency specifically designed to deal with
such clear policy questions as the one presented in National Trea-
sury. It is submitted that this decision not only usurped the power
of the FLRA, but also may have a potentially chilling effect on the
free bargaining process.
Rhea Floersheimer
